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JAPANESE APPROACHES TO EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
IN COMPETITION LAW 
 
MAREK MARTYNISZYN* 
 
Abstract 
Extraterritorial application of domestic competition law is an important feature of the current 
regulatory framework governing anticompetitive conduct. Japan was initially hesitant to apply 
its Anti-Monopoly Act in such a manner. However, over the last two decades there has been a 
significant shift in its approach. Japan has gradually embraced extraterritoriality and the Japan 
Fair Trade Commission has actively enforced competition law in a purely offshore context. 
This article investigates this evolution and considered the most recent and controversial cases 
in which Japan has applied its laws in a distinctive fashion. 
Keywords: competition law, extraterritorial jurisdiction, extraterritoriality, effects doctrine, 
Anti-Monopoly Act, Japan 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The international community developed a range of legal frameworks to deal with various 
transnational or international phenomena. For example, the World Trade Organisation was 
established to handle public restraints to trade. However, no multilateral solution has been 
adopted to deal with private anticompetitive conduct stretching beyond State borders. In effect, 
the harm arising from international cartels or transnational mergers often would have been left 
unaddressed if States did not apply their domestic competition laws extraterritorially.1  
Japan was initially hesitant to apply its competition law extraterritorially. Its approach 
was restrained, even within the conservative remits set by the well-established principles of 
international law. Moreover, for a long time Japan did not recognize extraterritoriality in cases 
involving only foreign conduct. In fact, it actively protested against US extraterritorial 
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1 See M Martyniszyn, 'Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target Your Neighbour? Analysis in Light of Recent Case 
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assertions in such cases. However, the Japanese position has evolved. Over time, Japan not 
only embraced far-reaching jurisdictional assertions but it also moved into the vanguard, 
pushing the limits of extraterritorial jurisdiction in a manner hitherto unseen. The most recent 
developments could potentially cause international tension if they withstand legal challenge 
and become an accepted approach.  
This article investigates Japan’s evolving position on the extraterritorial application of 
domestic competition laws over two decades of significant change. This issue requires careful 
analysis given the importance of Japan’s outward-focused economy and its integration in 
global supply chains. 
This article proceeds by outlining the doctrinal context and the jurisdictional practice 
of the US and the EU in Part II. Part III presents the Japanese regulatory framework and its 
initially restrained approach. The evolution of Japan’s position on the US reliance on 
extraterritoriality is analysed in Part IV. Part V focuses on changes implemented by Japan in 
the last two decades, showing a gradual but significant shift in the way Japan approaches 
transnational anticompetitive conduct. Japan has clearly demonstrated its willingness and 
capability to apply domestic competition law extraterritorially and to play an active role in this 
regard internationally. However, this paper argues that most recent extraterritorial assertions 
are excessive and could create unnecessary international friction if not restrained. 
II. DOCTRINAL CONTEXT AND THE PRACTICE OF THE US AND THE EU 
International law recognizes jurisdictional principles which permit a State to regulate conduct 
beyond its borders—extraterritorially.2 They emerged in response to the problems which would 
persist if jurisdiction was limited to the two traditional bases (territoriality and nationality).3 
The most pertinent for the purposes of competition law is the principle of objective 
territoriality, formulated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in Lotus in 1927.4 It 
was held that a State may assert jurisdiction in a case when only part of the offence—one of its 
constituent elements—has been physically committed within its territory.5 The principle of 
objective territoriality enables authorities to deal with various types of transnational 
anticompetitive arrangements. However, it does not support jurisdiction in cases involving 
purely foreign conduct of foreign entities that lead to harm in the domestic market. Given the 
growing importance of international business, this inadequacy led to the formulation of the 
effects doctrine—a principle which allows States to apply laws extraterritorially by recognizing 
that the economic harm suffered in the forum is sufficient to provide the necessary nexus. 
The effects doctrine was first formulated by a US federal court in 1945 in Alcoa, a case 
concerning an international output-regulating cartel.6 It was held that ‘any state may impose 
                                                          
2 These are subjective and objective territoriality, passive personality, security and universality principles. RY 
Jennings, 'Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws' (1957) 33 British Ybk Intl Law 153. 
3 BH Oxman, 'Jurisdiction of States' in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, online ed. (OUP 2008) para 11. 
4 France v. Turkey, Ser. A., No. 10 (PCIJ 1927). 
5 Ibid, 23. 
6 United States v. Aluminium Company of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945). 
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liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has 
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends’.7 Economic harm was recognized 
as a sufficiently close connection for jurisdictional purposes, enabling the US authorities to 
pursue foreign antitrust violators harming US markets.  
The doctrine met with a fierce critique internationally because it supported potentially 
unlimited jurisdiction.8 Foreign governments including Japan9 repeatedly intervened with the 
US government or directly before US courts to protest against US assertion of the effects 
doctrine.10 However, over time, foreign States stopped protesting, implicitly and—at times—
explicitly recognizing the doctrine’s validity. Meanwhile, two tests encapsulating the effects 
doctrine have been formulated in the US. The first, incorporated in the 1982 Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), stipulates that in cases not dealing with imports, US 
antitrust law applies to those arrangements which have a direct, substantial and reasonably 
foreseeable effect on US commerce.11 The second, formulated by the US Supreme Court in 
Hartford Fire, provides that US antitrust law applies ‘to foreign conduct that was meant to 
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States [citations 
omitted]’.12 Both tests qualify the necessary effects, indicating that trivial harm does not meet 
the threshold. 
Various iterations of the doctrine, often carrying various labels, were adopted in 
different jurisdictions.13 Germany14 and China15, for example, introduced statutory provisions 
explicitly providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of domestic harm. Other 
regimes, for example the EU and ultimately also Japan, embraced the doctrine by interpreting 
existing provisions.  
The EU applied its competition laws extraterritorially almost from its inception. 
Beginning in the 1960s, the European Commission—the EU’s law enforcer—interpreted the 
relevant provisions of EU law, which were mute on their scope of application, as being 
applicable to all arrangements affecting competition in the EU.16 The European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) endorsed asserting jurisdiction on the basis of the effects doctrine only in 1988, in 
Woodpulp, a case involving a foreign cartel.17 The Court formulated its own jurisdictional test, 
noting that a prohibited agreement is composed of two elements: its formation and its 
implementation, with the location of the latter being the decisive factor (the implementation 
                                                          
7 Ibid, 443. 
8 See, for example, Jennings (n 2) 160. 
9 See below discussed in Part IV. 
10 Some States went further and introduced legislation hindering US enforcement. See M Martyniszyn, 
'Legislation Blocking Antitrust Investigations and the September 2012 Russian Executive Order' (2014) 37(1) 
World Competition 103. 
11 15 U.S.C.A. § 6a. 
12 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).  
13 See discussion in M Martyniszyn, 'On extraterritoriality and the Gazprom case' (2015) 36(7) ECLR 291. 
14 Per Art 98(2) of the German Competition Law [1957] BGBI 1081. 
15 Art 2 of the Anti-Monopoly Law. 
16 European Commission, 64/233/CEE, Decision on an Application for Negative Clearance submitted under 
Article 2 of Council Regulation No 17, V/A-00061- Grosfillex/Fillistorf, OJ L58, 915-916 (1969). 
17 Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v. Commission 
[1988] ECR 5193. 
4 
 
test).18 It was understood that implementation requires some affirmative act, such as direct sales 
to an EU purchaser.19 Moreover, in Gencor, a merger case, the Court of First Instance explained 
that the EU’s rules apply extraterritorially whenever ‘it is foreseeable that a proposed 
concentration will have an immediate and substantial effect’ in the EU.20 Most recently, in 
Intel, a case dealing with abuse of a dominant position by a non-EU firm, the General Court 
clarified that a direct sale is only one means of implementing an agreement.21  
Overall, the EU’s tests require showing some non-negligible economic harm in order 
to support an extraterritorial assertion. That is a common requirement among jurisdictions 
applying their competition laws extraterritorially. Extraterritoriality in competition law is now 
a well-entrenched feature of the global regulatory framework governing transnational business. 
What differs among regimes is the degree of clarity relating to the jurisdictional tests, 
substantive differences in domestic laws and the scope of actual enforcement. 
III. THE JAPANESE FRAMEWORK AND THE RESTRAINED APPROACH 
The Japanese Antimonopoly Act was introduced in 194722 during the Allied occupation of 
Japan in an effort to prevent a resurgence of the pre-war structures of industry (so-called 
zaibatsu).23 The Act was based on US antitrust law and modelled on the US administrative 
enforcement system, with the Federal Trade Commission, vested with investigatory and quasi-
judicial powers, at the apex. 
Confusingly, the Antimonopoly Act has two potentially overlapping provisions. Article 
3 prohibits firms from engaging in unreasonable restraints of trade, whereas Article 6 forbids 
entering into ‘an international agreement or an international contract which contains such 
matters as fall under unreasonable restraint of trade or unfair trade practices’. The latter 
provision can be read as preventing firms from entering into any anticompetitive agreements, 
even if operationalised and affecting only foreign markets; whereas the former deals with only 
domestic conduct. Another interpretation suggests that the prohibition of Article 6 would apply 
prior to the actual implementation of any practice, being aimed at preventing violations of 
Article 3. Article 6 can be viewed as a legislative error,24 although legislative history suggests 
a different answer.25 Moreover, prior to the 1997 Amendment of the Act firms were required, 
                                                          
18 Ibid, para 16. 
19 DGF Lange and JB Sandage, 'The Wood Pulp Decision and its Implications for the Scope of EC Competition 
Law' (1989) 26 CMLR 159. 
20 Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd v. Commission, [1999] ECR II-753, para 90. 
21 Case T‑286/09, Intel Corp v. Commission, paras 302-07. 
22 Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Act No. 54 of 14 April 1947. 
23 M Matsushita, International Trade and Competition Law in Japan (OUP 1993) 76-86. 
24 See discussion in M Matsushita, 'The Antimonopoly Act of Japan and International Transactions' (1970) 14 
Japanese Annual of Intl Law 8-9. 
25 Article 6 was adopted from the Imperial Ordinance No. 33 promulgated in January 1946, which required persons 
who were participating in any international cartels to notify the authorities and also to withdraw from such 
agreements. It also prohibited entering into any such arrangements. The Ordinance was promulgated in response 
to a Memorandum on Dissolution of Holding Companies issued in November 1945 by the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers. See Y Ohara, 'International Application of the Japanese Antimonopoly Act' (1986) 10(3) 
Swiss Rev Intl Competition Law 8-9. 
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under the now abolished Article 6(2), to notify the Japanese Federal Trade Commission (JFTC) 
of any international agreements or contracts they entered into.  
The Act does not address the question of its jurisdictional reach. It neither provides an 
explicit textual basis for extraterritoriality, nor does it set any territorial limits. Older Japanese 
legislation which was intended to apply to foreign activities typically included explicit 
provisions to in that effect.26 However in Japanese law there is no general presumption against 
extraterritoriality. The relevant guiding rule can be found in the Japanese Constitution, which 
imposes a general requirement to follow the rules of international law.27 
Hence, this is a matter to be determined by the practice of the JFTC, subject to judicial 
review. So far, the Courts have played a very limited role in the development of the doctrine, 
mostly due to the fact that the JFTC’s decisions were rarely challenged. Moreover, private 
enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law was limited. 
In the first decades following the enactment of the Antimonopoly Act, the prevailing 
view, also held by the JFTC, was that the Act applied to all entities carrying on business in 
Japan.28 In 1965, the Japanese Committee of the International Law Association found that ‘only 
one rule is unanimously accepted; A country does not have regulatory jurisdiction over 
foreigners acting in a foreign country, even though the act eventually brings economic injury 
to the former country’.29  
Japan’s first transnational case was the 1949 investigation of the conduct of numerous 
foreign shipping operators, which allegedly fixed cargo rates. Partly due to the protest of the 
UK government, shortly afterwards the 1949 Marine Transport Act was enacted,30 excluding, 
under certain conditions, agreements among shippers from the scope of the Antimonopoly Act. 
Ultimately, the case was resolved in favour of the shipping firms.31 
In 1964 the JFTC brought a similar case against the Japan Homeward Freight 
Conference, involving Japanese and foreign shipping companies. The foreign defendants 
challenged the JFTC’s action, arguing that since the agreement was concluded in London and 
was not implemented in Japan, the JFTC lacked jurisdiction on the matter.32 The agency took 
the view that the agreement was illegal, finding that the cartelists engaged in business activities 
in Japan. The restrictive terms agreed abroad were forced upon the Japanese customers, hence 
key elements of the conduct were operationalised in Japan. The JFTC did not find the 
overarching London agreement illegal, but only the subsequent contracts with parties in Japan 
                                                          
26 For example, Article 2 of the Japanese Penal Code provides a list of crimes in relation to which the Code applies 
even though they were committed outside the territory of Japan. See: Penal Code, Act No. 45 of 1907. 
27 Article 98(2) provides that ‘(t)he treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully 
observed.’ 
28 M Yazawa, 'Interim Report by the Committee on the Extraterritorial Effects of Trade Regulation' (1965) 9 
Japanese Annual Intl Law 176. 
29 Ibid, 177. 
30 In this vein Ohara (n 25) 21. 
31 JFTC decision, 10 KTS 51 (1959). See also Yazawa (n 28) 176. 
32 M Yazawa, 'Interim Report by the Committee on the Extraterritorial Effects of Trade Regulation' (1966) 10 
Japanese Annual Intl Law 103; Makoto Yazawa, 'Interim Report by the Committee on the Extraterritorial Effects 
of Trade Regulation' (1968) 12 Japanese Annual Intl Law 72. 
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which implemented it. The initial decision was successfully challenged on the grounds of 
invalidity of service of process, which had been made on the foreign entities’ Japanese agents, 
who did not have the authority to accept service. After some reconsideration, in 1972 the JFTC 
issued a new decision addressed to a number of foreign entities who had branch offices in Japan 
or who were actively conducting business in Japan, thus allowing the JFTC to overcome its 
inability to serve process abroad.33 
These early shipping conferences cases demonstrate the Japanese adherence to the 
doctrine of objective territoriality, requiring some conduct in Japan before Japanese law can be 
applied to foreign entities.34 However, the JFTC’s later approach was even more restrained. 
The agency went on challenging transnational anticompetitive arrangements, but typically only 
Japanese participants were addressees of any orders.35 It is unclear to what extent this was a 
projection of the Japanese view regarding how transnational conduct should be regulated in the 
fragmented global regulatory system and to what extent it was a result of procedural and 
practical difficulties faced by the JFTC. 
For example, in the late 1960s the JFTC investigated an exclusive distributorship 
agreement between a Japanese distributor, Novo, and a Danish pharmaceutical firm, Amano. 
It ordered the elimination of anticompetitive clauses in the agreement, but the only addressee 
of the decision was the Japanese firm.36 The Danish firm attempted to challenge the decision, 
but the Tokyo High Court found that the firm lacked standing.37 In effect, although Japanese 
law was not applied extraterritorially (in the sense that the decision was not addressed to a 
foreign entity), it negatively affected a foreign firm’s operations. Hence, the decision was 
extraterritorial in nature.38 
IV. OPPOSITION TO THE US RELIANCE ON THE EFFECTS DOCTRINE 
The gradual change in Japan’s position on extraterritoriality in competition law can be traced 
through the formal positions communicated by the Japanese government to US authorities. 
Such communications typically addressed significant US policy changes and particular 
enforcement efforts. 
For example, in 1988 the US Department of Justice (DoJ) issued Antitrust Enforcement 
Guidelines for International Operations.39 The Guidelines clarified that although US antitrust 
law is considered to apply to all conduct having direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable 
effects on US commerce, the US authorities will focus its enforcement efforts only on those 
                                                          
33 Ohara (n 25) 23, 37-38. 
34 'Dumping Regulations and Competition Policy, Extraterritorial Application of the Antimonopoly Act: Report 
of the Study Group of the Antimonopoly Act on External Affairs Issues (Summary)', FTC/Japan views, No 9, 
July 1990, 27. 
35 E Kameoka, Competition Law and Policy in Japan and the EU (Edward Elgar 2014) 193. 
36 JFTC Decision of 12 January 1970, 16 KTS 138. 
37 Decision of the Tokyo High Court, 19 May 1971; upheld on appeal— Decision of the Supreme Court, 20 June 
1076, Supreme Court Civil Cases Reporter, Vol 29, 1976, 1592 at seq. 
38 Matsushita talks about the decision having ‘some indirect extraterritorial effect’. Matsushita (n 24) 15. 
39 Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1988), 55 Antitrust & 
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391. 
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arrangements which harm US consumers. But in 1992 the DoJ declared a significant change in 
its policy, announcing that it would also challenge those foreign arrangements which harm US 
exports, regardless of whether the conduct in question directly harms US consumers.40 This 
met with criticism from foreign authorities, including Japan. The Japanese government 
expressed its concerns, observing that such expansive extraterritorial assertions were not 
permitted under international law.41  
The Japanese government also used amicus curiae briefs to present its views in 
individual antitrust cases pending before US courts.42 Such submissions of foreign 
governments are rare.43 Japan submitted amicus briefs in at least seven antitrust cases in the 
US.44 In five of these cases Japan opposed US extraterritorial jurisdictional assertions either in 
general or as sought by the plaintiffs.45 These amicus interventions demonstrate how the 
Japanese position on the issue of extraterritoriality has shifted over time. 
In 1985 in Matsushita,46 a case dealing with alleged predatory pricing of Japanese 
exports to the US, the Japanese government noted that ‘the exercise of a state's sovereignty 
involves only control of the activity of its own nationals within its territory with respect to its 
own export trade, foreign courts should not question or punish such activity’.47 A rather similar 
position was expressed by Japan in 1996, in Nippon Paper,48 a case involving price-fixing 
among Japanese producers of fax paper. It was the first case in which the US asserted 
extraterritorial jurisdiction for the purposes of imposing criminal sanctions on foreign 
defendants. The products in question were sold to unaffiliated trading houses in Japan on the 
condition that they charge the inflated prices when reselling in the US. In this case the Japanese 
position was very clear: ‘The Government of Japan, like many other industrialized Nations, 
holds the view that the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act to the conduct of those 
who are not United States citizens or nationals is invalid under international law.’49 Japan 
considered that the application of US competition laws to the Japanese activities of Japanese 
                                                          
40 US Department of Justice, 'Justice Department Will Challenge Foreign Restraints on U.S. Exports Under 
Antitrust Laws', 3 April 1992, at <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1992/211137.pdf>.  
41 See the Comment of the Government of Japan on the 1994 Draft Guidelines quoted in T Kojima, International 
Conflicts Over the Extraterritorial Application of Competition Law in a Borderless Economy Weatherheard 
Center for International Affairs at Harvard University-Fellows' Papers 2001-2002 at 
<http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/fellows/papers/2001-02/>.  
42 Amicus briefs are submissions by entities who are not a party to a lawsuit, but who petition the court because 
they have a strong interest in the subject matter of the case. BA Garner, et al. (eds), Black's Law Dictionary, 9th 
ed. (West Group 2009) 98. 
43 For analysis of, see M Martyniszyn, 'Foreign States’ Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Antitrust Cases' (2016) 
61(4) Antitrust Bulletin 611. 
44 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); U.S. v. Nippon Paper Industries 
Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997); F. Hoffmann- La Roche Ltd v. Empagran SA, 542 U.S. 155 (2004); In re 
Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litigation, 477 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2007); Goss Intern. Corp. v. Man Roland 
Druckmaschinen AG, 491 F.3d 355 (8th Cir. 2007); In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, 2011 WL 
723571 (N.D. California 2011); Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2015). 
45 In two cases Japanese amicus interventions dealt with non-jurisdictional issues. 
46 Matsushita (n 44). 
47 Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief for the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 1985 WL 669664, 6 (U.S. 1985). 
48 Nippon Paper (n 44). 
49 Brief of Amicus Curiae the Government of Japan, U.S. v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., 1996 WL 33659179, 12 
(1st Cir. 1996). 
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firms was invalid given the absence of a substantial link between the conduct at stake and the 
forum asserting jurisdiction. The economic effects of the challenged conduct were not 
considered a sufficient link. Hence, both in Matsushita and Nippon Paper Japan opposed 
extraterritorial assertions made on the basis of the effects doctrine. 
In three later cases Japan no longer challenged US reliance on the effects doctrine as 
such. In particular, in Empagran (a private action brought by US and foreign purchasers of 
vitamins against a number of foreign vitamins manufacturers, including a Japanese firm), in its 
brief before the US Supreme Court, Japan opposed any further expansion of then established 
extraterritorial reach of US laws.50 On remand, in 2005, Japan submitted another amicus jointly 
with the governments of Germany, UK, Switzerland and the Netherlands.51 It was asserted that 
extraterritorial jurisdiction should be limited ‘to those rare situations where the foreign conduct 
creates a domestic effect that is directly and inextricably bound to the foreign harm. Merely 
identifying a domestic effect or proclaiming it to be a byproduct of the anticompetitive conduct 
is not sufficient. Otherwise, U.S. court jurisdiction over foreign-based claims would be 
unlimited (…)’.52 In 2007 these representations were brought to the court’s attention in In re 
Monosodium Glutamate, a case involving another foreign price-fixing cartel involving 
Japanese firms, which was unsuccessfully challenged in the US in relation to the harm suffered 
in non-US markets by non-US plaintiffs.53  
Finally, in Motorola Mobility,54 the question was again whether a US plaintiff could sue 
to recover damages with respect to harm suffered by its foreign subsidiaries which purchased 
the cartel-affected products outside the US that were incorporated into final products and 
subsequently sold by the plaintiff in the US. A number of foreign governments intervened in 
order to oppose Motorola’s claim. In its brief the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI) underlined that the Japanese Government ‘strongly opposes assertion of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction that would unreasonably interfere with sovereign authority and 
violate fundamental principles of international law’, directing the court’s attention to the 
Japanese submissions in Empagran.55 In its second brief, METI explicitly recognized ‘the 
necessity of the extraterritorial application of competition law of each country to the extent that 
anti-competitive activities affect their own market’.56 However, it opposed excessive 
extraterritorial assertions, such as in the case at hand, involving claims arising from foreign 
purchases of cartel-affected goods by foreign subsidiaries of US firms.57 Notably, this latter 
                                                          
50 Brief for the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, F. Hoffmann- La Roche Ltd v. 
Empagran SA, 2004 WL 226390 (U.S. 2004). 
51 Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Japan, the 
Swiss Confederation, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees 
in F. Hoffmann- La Roche Ltd v. Empagran SA, 2005 WL 3873712 (C.A.D.C. 2005). 
52 Ibid, 6. 
53 In re Monosodium Glutamate (n 44). 
54 Motorola Mobility (n 44). 
55 Brief of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan As Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Reconsideration, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 2013 WL 7098182 (N. D. Ill. 2013). 
56 Brief of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan As Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Reconsideration, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 2014 WL 5422011, 3 (7th Cir. 2014). 
57 Ibid, 1. 
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METI view is different from the position taken by the JFTC, which at that stage had asserted 
jurisdiction in a case involving foreign violators in an even more far-reaching manner.58 
The analysis of representations made before US courts in competition cases shows that 
the Japanese position in relation to extraterritoriality evolved. Initially Japan was actively 
opposing extraterritorial assertions based on the effects doctrine, considering them illegitimate 
under international law. However, these protests were not sustained. Later cases show explicit 
recognition of the validity of extraterritorial assertions, which Japan considered legitimate 
when the foreign anticompetitive conduct directly causes harm in the forum. This recognition 
is noteworthy, given that Japan was repeatedly at the receiving end of enforcement—Japanese 
firms and individuals were facing sanctions for their anticompetitive conduct harming other 
markets, principally in the US and in the EU. 
V. THE SHIFT IN THE JAPANESE POSITION 
This part of the article analyses legislative and policy-oriented steps taken in Japan, which 
show a gradual, but significant shift in the Japanese approach to extraterritoriality. The majority 
of these developments occurred in the last two decades. They indicate piecemeal approach to 
regulatory reform, undertaken to enable the JFTC to deal with transnational competitive harm. 
A. The 1990 Study Group report 
Both the practical and symbolic turning point in the Japanese approach to extraterritoriality in 
competition law dates back to 1990, when a Study Group convened by the JFTC opined in 
favour of embracing the effects doctrine.59 The Study Group report was influential and it 
continues to be referred to by multilateral bodies.60 It concluded that whenever foreign firms 
engage in activities such as exporting to Japan and the said activities are sufficient to constitute 
a violation of the Antimonopoly Act, then the Act applies.61 By recognizing exporting to Japan 
as a sufficient jurisdictional link the Group embraced a form of the effects doctrine,62 similar 
in scope to that by then recognized by the ECJ in the EU.63 At the same time it was 
acknowledged that, in its actual practice, the JFTC remained faithful to the principle of 
objective territoriality, which partly explained the procedural difficulties of serving notice on 
entities not based in Japan. The report recommended amending or interpreting the law so as to 
facilitate service of process in a more flexible manner. 
                                                          
58 See below notes 84-89 and accompanying text. 
59 Dumping Regulations and Competition Policy, Extraterritorial Application of the Antimonopoly Act: Report 
of the Study Group (n 34). For discussion see J Tamura, 'US Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law to 
Japanese Keiretsu' (1992) 25 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 393-96. 
60 See, for example, OECD, Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement: Roundtable on Cartel 
Jurisdiction Issues, including the Effects Doctrine: Japan, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2008)88 (21 October 2008), 5-
7. 
61 Dumping Regulations and Competition Policy, Extraterritorial Application of the Antimonopoly Act: Report 
of the Study Group (n 34) 27. 
62 In this vein also Matsushita, who served as a member of the Group. See M Matsushita, 'Application of the 
Japanese Antimonopoly Law to International Transactions' in M Bronckers and R Quick (eds), New Directions in 
International Economic Law: Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson (Kluwer Law International 2000) 563-64. 
63 See above notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
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The Group also offered a position on the issue of possible friction between States in 
relation to extraterritorial enforcement. It took the view that, prior to enforcement, the 
authorities should consider whether the conduct in question had caused a material effect in the 
Japanese market. Should the answer be positive, it should still be considered whether 
enforcement should not be abstained from ‘out of consideration for easing confrontations with 
the country involved’.64 Hence, while recognizing a possibly broad extraterritorial application 
of domestic law, the Group recommended restraining enforcement in certain cases as a matter 
of comity, not on the basis of any legal obligation. Moreover, by underlining the necessity of 
a material effect in the Japanese market, it proposed an important qualification of the effects 
necessary to validate Japanese jurisdiction, in line with prevailing international practice. 
The Nordion case, decided in 1998, is often considered to be the first instance of the 
JFTC’s reliance on the effects doctrine. The Canadian firm Nordion agreed to supply a 
particular product (a radioactive isotope used in medical procedures) to Japanese firms under 
the condition that they would not purchase it from any other sources. Nordion did not have any 
presence in Japan, but it sold goods to Japan and the agreement at stake was concluded in Japan. 
The JFTC ordered Nordion to stop its restrictive practices in the Japanese market.65 The JFTC 
did not clarify the jurisdictional basis it relied on. It might have indeed embraced the effects 
doctrine. However, the fact that the underlying agreement was concluded and executed in Japan 
may be seen as a sufficient, albeit not particularly strong, link allowing for reliance on the 
principle of objective territoriality. Nevertheless, the case demonstrates the new attitude of the 
JFTC and its willingness to reach beyond Japan’s borders in the enforcement of domestic 
competition rules. 
B. Reform of merger review 
From a transnational perspective, some important changes to Japanese merger review came 
into force in January 1999. Under the old regime review was limited in scope to transactions 
taking place ‘in Japan’. At least one of the parties to a proposed transaction must have been 
Japanese in order to trigger the applicability of the Antimonopoly Law. That is why the JFTC 
was unable to review, for example, the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger, despite a 
Japanese airline being a major purchaser of passenger planes produced by the parties and even 
though the Japanese market was to be significantly affected.66 The 1998 Amendment removed 
the territorial nexus, making it possible to review foreign transactions.67 The triggering factor 
is sales in Japan of a specified magnitude. 
The new rules were applied for the first time in 1999 to the proposed merger between 
Exxon and Mobil, two US entities. Following the review, the JFTC cleared the transaction.68 
Similarly, in 2005 the JFTC analysed the proposed acquisition of Guidant by Johnson & 
                                                          
64 Dumping Regulations and Competition Policy, Extraterritorial Application of the Antimonopoly Act: Report 
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Johnson—another transaction involving two US firms. The JFTC cleared the transaction, 
satisfied with remedies imposed by foreign counterparts.69 Although in both cases the firms 
were foreign, they had subsidiaries in Japan. Hence these were not purely offshore transactions. 
The first case in which the new merger regime was applied in a foreign-to-foreign 
context was the proposed transaction between BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, in 2008. Neither of 
the firms had any presence in Japan, hence the JFTC must have relied on the effects doctrine 
when it considered reviewing the proposed deal. The investigation did not culminate in any 
decision as the deal was abandoned in anticipation of the negative outcome of the review.70 The 
firms attempted to merge again in 2010 and again they withdrew their notification after the 
JFTC informed them of its objections.71 The abandoned BHP Billiton/Rio Tinto merger 
provides a precedent that the Japanese merger review applies to all transactions which meet the 
prescribed thresholds, regardless of the firms’ actual presence in Japan. 
C. Changes in the rules governing service of process 
The changes to merger review necessitated adjustment of the rules governing service of 
process, which did not—at that time—allow for the delivery of documents to persons located 
overseas. In particular, Article 69(2) of the Antimonopoly Act incorporated, by reference, 
certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code dealing with the service of process. However, 
the provisions dealing with service of process abroad were not included. This shortcoming had 
already been identified by the Study Group in 1990.72 However, it remained unaddressed until 
the 2002 Amendment of the Antimonopoly Law.  
This important procedural issue significantly limited the JFTC’s enforcement 
capabilities. The agency was able to investigate conduct of a foreign entity only when the firm 
had Japanese agents who were authorised to receive service. That was the case, for example, 
in Nordion.73 The only other possibility for opening proceedings would have been if a foreign 
entity voluntarily submitted itself to the JFTC’s jurisdiction. The lack of a duly authorised 
agent in Japan allowed foreign firms to avoid the JFTC’s scrutiny, as demonstrated by one of 
the early shipping conferences cases.74  
The 2002 Amendment successfully rectified that deficiency. It made the provisions of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, dealing with service abroad, apply mutatis mutandis in the 
competition law context. Service of process can be now performed by Japanese consular staff 
                                                          
69 JFTC, The proposed acquisition of the stock of Guidant Corporation by Johnson & Johnson (9 December 2005), 
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control in Japan' (OECD Global Forum on Competition, 17 February 2011), at 
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abroad. Moreover, the JFTC can make service by publication.75 In the BHP Billiton and Rio 
Tinto merger review76, service abroad was commissioned to the Japanese consul in 
Melbourne.77 BHP Billiton refused to accept service and the JFTC made it effective by 
publication.78 
D. Pursuing international cartels 
The JFTC began challenging international cartels at the turn of the new millennium. It tried to 
investigate the Graphite Electrode cartel (in 1999) and Vitamins cartel (in 2001). Both cartels 
included Japanese firms and both were successfully investigated in the US and in the EU. 
However the JFTC failed to pursue its challenge, reportedly for want of evidence.79 In effect, 
the JFTC only issued ‘warnings’; non-binding administrative guidance to the cartelists.80  
In 2003 the JFTC investigated an international cartel of impact modifiers’ (plastic 
additives used in production of various plastic goods) producers. The investigation was closely 
coordinated—for the first time—with counterparts in the US, the EU and Canada. In this case 
the JFTC was successful. However it issued its Recommendation only to two Japanese 
members of the cartel.81 
In 2008, for the first time, the JFTC investigated a cartel involving foreign firms that 
did not have any subsidiaries or agents in Japan. The Marine Hose case involved five firms, 
four foreign and one Japanese. Following the investigation, the JFTC issued cease and desist 
orders against several foreign entities. However, foreign firms which did not supply Japanese 
customers were not fined. The Antimonopoly Law provides that when calculating fines the 
JFTC should use as a benchmark ‘the amount of sales from the relevant goods or services’, 
without any further guidance.82 The JFTC defined the relevant market as the domestic market. 
Therefore, firms which did not generate any local turnover avoided penalties. As a result, , only 
the Japanese Bridgestone Corporation was fined.83 
If there was any remaining doubt as to the Japanese stance on extraterritoriality in 
competition law, it was resolved by the JFTC’s Cathode ray tubes (CRT) decisions. In 2009 
and 2010, the JFTC fined a number of foreign firms (including foreign subsidiaries of Japanese 
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firms) involved in a cartel fixing prices of cathode ray tubes.84 Such products are a key input 
used in the production of televisions. The case involved no cartel conduct in Japan and no direct 
sales of cartel-affected inputs to Japan. Foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firm purchased the 
cartel-affected products from the cartelists outside Japan. These inputs were incorporated into 
final products in Southeast Asian countries by subsidiaries of Japanese firms. Subsequently, 
the majority of the final products (that is, TVs incorporating the cartel-affected inputs) were 
sold in various markets outside Japan.85 Cartelists themselves did not sell any final products in 
Japan. In fact, it is unclear—and the JFTC did not reveal—to what extent the final products 
were sold in Japan. The JFTC’s decisions were re-affirmed following a request to reconsider.86 
It is worth noting that the JFTC served process by publication.87 
The CRT case illustrates not only Japanese reliance on the effects doctrine, but also 
possibly one of the furthest-reaching extraterritorial assertions the international community has 
witnessed to date. The cartel-affected inputs were not sold in Japan. Some of the products 
incorporating the cartel-affected inputs were possibly (this matter is not clear) brought to and 
sold in Japan by foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firms. This particular context makes the 
JFTC’s extraterritorial assertion unique. No other competition authority has decided to take a 
similar step. The JFTC considered it legitimate to assert jurisdiction when the contracts for the 
supply of the cartel-affected products to Japanese subsidiaries outside Japan were negotiated 
directly between the foreign cartelists and Japanese parent companies. Such an approach 
significantly extends the reach of domestic laws. While it can be seen as a possibly inevitable 
step in the fight against transnational anticompetitive conduct,88 it constitutes a departure from 
the recognized jurisdictional principles and practice of other States. It may be difficult, if not 
impossible, to reconcile the position of the JFTC with the representations made by the Japanese 
METI before a US court in Motorola Mobility. In that case, in a similar context, the Japanese 
ministry protested against what it called an excessive extraterritorial assertion.89 
In CRT case the JFTC considered that the foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firms and 
their Japanese parent companies constituted single economic entities for the purposes of the 
application of the Antimonopoly Act. If the parent companies have a decisive influence over 
the subsidiaries, such an assertion is justifiable. Indeed, in this case the parents negotiated the 
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supply contracts with the foreign cartelists. However, the fact that Japanese firms suffered harm 
due to anticompetitive conduct does not—in the eyes of international law—automatically grant 
the JFTC competence to apply domestic laws to the underlying conduct. The effects doctrine 
allows for jurisdictional assertions only when some non-trivial harm was suffered in the 
domestic market. In CRT the cartel-affected products were not sold in Japan. If the final 
products incorporating them were sold outside Japan, that is, if none of them reached Japan, 
there is no direct economic harm in the Japanese market to address. The fact that Japanese 
firms suffered harm, on its own, is of little relevance. What matters is the location of the harm. 
In a similar manner Japanese tort law would not apply in a case arising from a car accident in 
Europe and in which a Japanese national suffered an injury due to a driver’s negligence. 
Moreover, in the CRT case the JFTC for the first time imposed fines on foreign 
cartelists. When calculating fines the JFTC did not rely simply on the value of the cartel-
affected components incorporated in the final products imported to Japan by foreign 
subsidiaries of Japanese firms. Instead, the JFTC used as the benchmark all sales of cartel-
affected components to foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firms, regardless of whether the final 
products incorporating them entered the Japanese market. In this regard the JFTC departed 
from its earlier practice and interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Antimonopoly Act.90 
In effect, the JFTC sanctioned the foreign cartelists also for the harm which was not inflicted 
on the Japanese market. Takigawa correctly points out that the inclusion of such sales for the 
purposes of calculation of fines was an error.91 While foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firms 
might have suffered harm due to the foreign price-fixing, any such harm was not suffered in 
Japan. The present global regulatory framework suggests that the JFTC should have abstained 
from assuming competence to address such overall harm. 
The JFTC’s Commissioner Odagiri wrote a supplementary opinion to the JFTC’s 
decision following the request to reconsider.92 It is particularly noteworthy because the JFTC’s 
Commissioners rarely issue separate opinions. Although Commissioner Odagiri ultimately 
supported the majority, his opinion reads like, and should be seen as, a clear dissent. 
Commissioner Odagiri argued that the Antimonopoly Act should be applied extraterritorially 
only when purchasers of the cartel-affected products are in Japan, or alternatively—if the Act 
were to apply in other cases—any fines imposed should relate to the value of the cartel-affected 
products incorporated in final products sold in Japan. In Commissioner Odagiri’s view, the 
adopted fining methodology was excessive. He noted that such an approach could lead to 
conflicting outcomes and over-enforcement if more jurisdictions were to follow it. What seems 
to have convinced Commissioner Odagiri to ultimately side with the majority was the fact that 
competition authorities in the relevant Southeast Asian jurisdictions (where the Japanese 
subsidiaries which purchased the cartel-affected products were located) did not take any action 
against the cartelists. This, however, is not a consideration which legitimatises far-reaching 
extraterritorial assertions or validates a fining policy. 
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The foreign defendants appealed the JFTC decisions. In early 2016 the Tokyo High 
Court issued three judgments, delivered by different judicial panels, upholding the JFTC’s 
jurisdiction.93 In essence, the Court found that the foreign price-fixing agreement was intended 
to harm Japanese customers-purchasers, in this context Japanese parent companies.94 The 
appeal is currently pending before the Supreme Court. 
In CRT the JFTC sent a clear signal to the international community that it will no longer 
shy away from enforcing domestic competition law extraterritorially in an expansive manner. 
However, the approach taken in relation to both jurisdiction and calculation of fines goes 
significantly beyond the remits established by international practice.95 If followed, the 
Antimonopoly Act could be applied to any conduct prohibited by the Act whenever it affects 
Japanese firms, regardless of whether they operate in Japan or elsewhere. Moreover, fines can 
be imposed in relation to sales of the cartel-affected goods even if they took place outside Japan 
and the products at stake did not reach Japanese consumers, be it directly or through 
transformed products. Such an approach is likely to generate tensions with other States, as 
Commissioner Odagiri rightly noted in his opinion. 
The new attitude of the JFTC in relation to transnational violations is reflected also in 
organisational developments in the agency. In particular, in 2010 the JFTC created a separate 
International Cartels Investigation Unit to deal with such cases.96 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While initially hesitant about extraterritoriality in competition law enforcement, Japan 
gradually embraced it and began dealing with transnational anticompetitive conduct. Around 
the turn of the new millennium Japan recognized the effects doctrine to support jurisdiction in 
cases involving offshore conduct causing in-bound competitive harm. That step might have 
been informed by the growing reliance on the doctrine by other jurisdictions and, in general, 
more active enforcement globally. The evolution of Japan’s stance carried a promise of 
enabling better safeguarding of competition in the Japanese market and therefore it should be 
welcomed. A process of regulatory reform followed to facilitate the JFTC taking an active role 
in the fight against transnational anticompetitive conduct. However, the reform is piecemeal 
and reactive in nature, not comprehensive. For example, the relevant rules dealing with the 
service of process were amended three years after the review of offshore mergers was first 
formally enabled. Similarly, around 2000 the JFTC started showing eagerness to pursue 
international cartels, yet it took it a few years to actually bring a case against foreign cartelists. 
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The regulatory reform is ongoing. The recent CRT case shows that Japan is only now 
formulating the jurisdictional standards applicable in cases involving purely foreign conduct, 
in a learning-by-doing exercise. In this context, it seems that Japan has moved into the vanguard 
of those pushing the outer limits of extraterritoriality in a manner hitherto unseen. The Anti-
Monopoly Act has been applied to the foreign conduct of foreign firms when the significance 
and the very presence of the harm in Japanese markets was unclear. The consistency of this 
approach with international law is questionable. It potentially undermines competition 
legislation in the affected foreign States. Moreover, in CRT the JFTC also adopted a 
controversial methodology of calculating fines for the wrongdoers. The fines related not only 
to the sales of the cartel-affected products which entered the Japanese market, but also went 
well beyond that threshold. Overall, in CRT the JFTC embarked on a collision course with 
foreign counterparts. The appeal is pending before the Japanese Supreme Court, which 
hopefully will avail itself of this opportunity to ascertain the limits of the extraterritorial reach 
of the Anti-Monopoly Act. If the JFTC’s approach is upheld and followed by other regimes, it 
is likely to also adversely affect Japanese firms that operate internationally and are engaged in 
conduct causing competitive harm in other markets, even if not directly or substantially. It may 
be that the JFTC sought to demonstrate its commitment to fighting offshore anticompetitive 
conduct, but it operated within a regulatory framework unprepared for such a re-focusing and 
picked a sub-optimal case. An amendment of the fining policy, which is currently being 
considered,97 may help to align at least the enforcement aspect with internationally prevalent 
practice. 
 Japanese competition law and policy cannot be ignored by businesses operating 
internationally. They would be well-advised to increase their awareness of the rules applicable 
in that jurisdiction given that the Japanese competition watchdog demonstrates determination 
to deal with transnational violations and apply the Anti-Monopoly Act in a far-reaching 
manner. 
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